We study a policy evaluation problem in centralized markets. We show that the aggregate impact of any marginal reform, the Marginal Policy Effect (MPE), is nonparametrically identified using data from a baseline equilibrium, without additional variation in the policy rule. We achieve this by constructing the equilibrium-adjusted outcome: a policy-invariant structural object that augments an agent's outcome with the full equilibrium externality their participation imposes on others. We show that these externalities can be constructed using estimands that are already common in empirical work. The MPE is identified as the covariance between our structural outcome and the reform's direction, providing a flexible tool for optimal policy targeting and a novel bridge to the Marginal Treatment Effects literature.

This paper demonstrates how reinforcement learning can explain two puzzling empirical patterns in household consumption behavior during economic downturns. I develop a model where agents use Q-learning with neural network approximation to make consumption-savings decisions under income uncertainty, departing from standard rational expectations assumptions. The model replicates two key findings from recent literature: (1) unemployed households with previously low liquid assets exhibit substantially higher marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) out of stimulus transfers compared to high-asset households (0.50 vs 0.34), even when neither group faces borrowing constraints, consistent with Ganong et al. (2024); and (2) households with more past unemployment experiences maintain persistently lower consumption levels after controlling for current economic conditions, a "scarring" effect documented by Malmendier and Shen (2024). Unlike existing explanations based on belief updating about income risk or ex-ante heterogeneity, the reinforcement learning mechanism generates both higher MPCs and lower consumption levels simultaneously through value function approximation errors that evolve with experience. Simulation results closely match the empirical estimates, suggesting that adaptive learning through reinforcement learning provides a unifying framework for understanding how past experiences shape current consumption behavior beyond what current economic conditions would predict.

We study whether liquidity and volatility proxies of a core set of cryptoassets generate spillovers that forecast market-wide risk. Our empirical framework integrates three statistical layers: (A) interactions between core liquidity and returns, (B) principal-component relations linking liquidity and returns, and (C) volatility-factor projections that capture cross-sectional volatility crowding. The analysis is complemented by vector autoregression impulse responses and forecast error variance decompositions (see Granger 1969; Sims 1980), heterogeneous autoregressive models with exogenous regressors (HAR-X, Corsi 2009), and a leakage-safe machine learning protocol using temporal splits, early stopping, validation-only thresholding, and SHAP-based interpretation. Using daily data from 2021 to 2025 (1462 observations across 74 assets), we document statistically significant Granger-causal relationships across layers and moderate out-of-sample predictive accuracy. We report the most informative figures, including the pipeline overview, Layer A heatmap, Layer C robustness analysis, vector autoregression variance decompositions, and the test-set precision-recall curve. Full data and figure outputs are provided in the artifact repository.

Small subsets of data with disproportionate influence on model outcomes can have dramatic impacts on conclusions, with a few data points sometimes overturning key findings. While recent work has developed methods to identify these \emph{most influential sets}, no formal theory exists to determine when their influence reflects genuine problems rather than natural sampling variation. We address this gap by developing a principled framework for assessing the statistical significance of most influential sets. Our theoretical results characterize the extreme value distributions of maximal influence and enable rigorous hypothesis tests for excessive influence, replacing current ad-hoc sensitivity checks. We demonstrate the practical value of our approach through applications across economics, biology, and machine learning benchmarks.

Instrumental variable methods are fundamental to causal inference when treatment assignment is confounded by unobserved variables. In this article, we develop a general nonparametric framework for identification and learning with multi-categorical or continuous instrumental variables. Specifically, we propose an additive instrumental variable framework to identify mean potential outcomes and the average treatment effect with a weighting function. Leveraging semiparametric theory, we derive efficient influence functions and construct consistent, asymptotically normal estimators via debiased machine learning. Extensions to longitudinal data, dynamic treatment regimes, and multiplicative instrumental variables are further developed. We demonstrate the proposed method by employing simulation studies and analyzing real data from the Job Training Partnership Act program.

Meritocratic systems, from admissions to hiring, aim to impartially reward skill and effort. Yet persistent disparities across race, gender, and class challenge this ideal. Some attribute these gaps to structural inequality; others to individual choice. We develop a game-theoretic model in which candidates from different socioeconomic groups differ in their perceived post-selection value--shaped by social context and, increasingly, by AI-powered tools offering personalized career or salary guidance. Each candidate strategically chooses effort, balancing its cost against expected reward; effort translates into observable merit, and selection is based solely on merit. We characterize the unique Nash equilibrium in the large-agent limit and derive explicit formulas showing how valuation disparities and institutional selectivity jointly determine effort, representation, social welfare, and utility. We further propose a cost-sensitive optimization framework that quantifies how modifying selectivity or perceived value can reduce disparities without compromising institutional goals. Our analysis reveals a perception-driven bias: when perceptions of post-selection value differ across groups, these differences translate into rational differences in effort, propagating disparities backward through otherwise "fair" selection processes. While the model is static, it captures one stage of a broader feedback cycle linking perceptions, incentives, and outcome--bridging rational-choice and structural explanations of inequality by showing how techno-social environments shape individual incentives in meritocratic systems.

Large Language Models are increasingly adopted as critical tools for accelerating innovation. This paper identifies and formalizes a systemic risk inherent in this paradigm: \textbf{Black Box Absorption}. We define this as the process by which the opaque internal architectures of LLM platforms, often operated by large-scale service providers, can internalize, generalize, and repurpose novel concepts contributed by users during interaction. This mechanism threatens to undermine the foundational principles of innovation economics by creating severe informational and structural asymmetries between individual creators and platform operators, thereby jeopardizing the long-term sustainability of the innovation ecosystem. To analyze this challenge, we introduce two core concepts: the idea unit, representing the transportable functional logic of an innovation, and idea safety, a multidimensional standard for its protection. This paper analyzes the mechanisms of absorption and proposes a concrete governance and engineering agenda to mitigate these risks, ensuring that creator contributions remain traceable, controllable, and equitable.

Bilevel programming is one of the very active areas of research with many real-life applications in economics and engineering. Bilevel problems are hierarchical problems consisting of lower-level and upper-level problems, respectively. The leader or the decision-maker for the upper-level problem decides first, and then the follower or the lower-level decision-maker chooses his/her strategy. In the case of multiple lower-level solutions, the bilevel problems are not well defined, and there are many ways to handle such a situation. One standard way is to put restrictions on the lower level problems (like strict convexity) so that nonuniqueness does not arise. However, those restrictions are not viable in many situations. Therefore, there are two standard formulations, called pessimistic formulations and optimistic formulations of the upper-level problem. A set-valued formulation has been proposed and has been studied in the literature. However, the study is limited to the continuous set-up with the assumption of value attainment, and the general case has not been considered. In this paper, we focus on the general case and study the connection among various notions of solution. Our main findings suggest that the set-valued formulation may not hold any bigger advantage than the existing optimistic and pessimistic formulation.

We characterize the extreme points of the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms for screening problems with linear utility. Our framework subsumes problems with and without transfers, such as monopoly pricing, principal-optimal bilateral trade and barter exchange, delegation and veto bargaining, or belief elicitation via proper scoring rules. In every problem with one-dimensional types, extreme points admit a tractable description. In every problem with multi-dimensional types, extreme points are dense in a rich subset of incentive-compatible mechanisms, which we call exhaustive mechanisms. Building on these characterizations, we derive parallel conclusions for mechanisms that can be rationalized as (uniquely) optimal under a fixed objective. For example, in the multi-good monopoly problem, mechanisms that uniquely maximize revenue for some type distribution are dense among all incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanisms. The proofs exploit a novel connection between menus of extreme points and indecomposable convex bodies, first studied by Gale (1954).

Certain extremum estimators have asymptotic distributions that are non-Gaussian, yet characterizable as the distribution of the $\argmax$ of a Gaussian process. This paper presents high-level sufficient conditions under which such asymptotic distributions admit a continuous distribution function. The plausibility of the sufficient conditions is demonstrated by verifying them in three examples, namely maximum score estimation, empirical risk minimization, and threshold regression estimation. In turn, the continuity result buttresses several recently proposed inference procedures whose validity seems to require a result of the kind established herein. A notable feature of the high-level assumptions is that one of them is designed to enable us to employ the Cameron-Martin theorem. In a leading special case, the assumption in question is demonstrably weak and appears to be close to minimal.

As e-commerce marketplaces continue to grow in popularity, it has become increasingly important to understand the role and impact of marketplace operators on competition and social welfare. We model a marketplace operator as an entity that not only facilitates third-party sales but can also choose to directly participate in the market as a competing seller. We formalize this market structure as a price-quantity Stackelberg duopoly in which the leader is a marketplace operator and the follower is an independent seller who shares a fraction of their revenue with the marketplace operator for the privilege of selling on the platform. The objective of the marketplace operator is to maximize a weighted sum of profit and a term capturing positive customer experience, whereas the independent seller seeks solely to maximize their own profit. We derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and find that it is often optimal for the marketplace operator to induce competition by offering the product at a low price to incentivize the independent seller to match their price.

We study the properties of macroeconomic survey forecast response averages as the number of survey respondents grows. Such averages are ``portfolios" of forecasts. We characterize the speed and pattern of the gains from diversification as a function of portfolio size (the number of survey respondents) in both (1) the key real-world data-based environment of the U.S. Survey of Professional Forecasters, and (2) the theoretical model-based environment of equicorrelated forecast errors. We proceed by proposing and comparing various direct and model-based ``crowd size signature plots", which summarize the forecasting performance of $k$-average forecasts as a function of $k$, where $k$ is the number of forecasts in the average. We then estimate the equicorrelation model for growth and inflation forecast errors by choosing model parameters to minimize the divergence between direct and model-based signature plots. The results indicate near-perfect equicorrelation model fit for both growth and inflation, which we explicate by showing analytically that, under very weak conditions, the direct and fitted equicorrelation model-based signature plots are identical at a particular model parameter configuration. That parameter configuration immediately suggests an analytic closed-form estimator for the direct signature plot, so that equicorrelation ultimately emerges as a device for convenient calculation of direct signature plots, rather than a separate ``model" producing separate signature plots. In any event we find that the gains from survey diversification are greater for inflation forecasts than for growth forecasts, and that they are largely exhausted with inclusion of 5-10 representative forecasters.

I develop a continuous functional framework for spatial treatment effects grounded in Navier-Stokes partial differential equations. Rather than discrete treatment parameters, the framework characterizes treatment intensity as continuous functions $\tau(\mathbf{x}, t)$ over space-time, enabling rigorous analysis of boundary evolution, spatial gradients, and cumulative exposure. Empirical validation using 32,520 U.S. ZIP codes demonstrates exponential spatial decay for healthcare access ($\kappa = 0.002837$ per km, $R^2 = 0.0129$) with detectable boundaries at 37.1 km. The framework successfully diagnoses when scope conditions hold: positive decay parameters validate diffusion assumptions near hospitals, while negative parameters correctly signal urban confounding effects. Heterogeneity analysis reveals 2-13 $\times$ stronger distance effects for elderly populations and substantial education gradients. Model selection strongly favors logarithmic decay over exponential ($\Delta \text{AIC} > 10,000$), representing a middle ground between exponential and power-law decay. Applications span environmental economics, banking, and healthcare policy. The continuous functional framework provides predictive capability ($d^*(t) = \xi^* \sqrt{t}$), parameter sensitivity ($\partial d^*/\partial \nu$), and diagnostic tests unavailable in traditional difference-in-differences approaches.

This paper develops a continuous functional framework for analyzing contagion dynamics in financial networks, extending the Navier-Stokes-based approach to network-structured spatial processes. We model financial distress propagation as a diffusion process on weighted networks, deriving a network diffusion equation from first principles that predicts contagion decay depends on the network's algebraic connectivity through the relation $\kappa = \sqrt{\lambda_2/D}$, where $\lambda_2$ is the second-smallest eigenvalue of the graph Laplacian and $D$ is the diffusion coefficient. Applying this framework to European banking data from the EBA stress tests (2018, 2021, 2023), we estimate interbank exposure networks using maximum entropy methods and track the evolution of systemic risk through the COVID-19 crisis. Our key finding is that network connectivity declined by 45\% from 2018 to 2023, implying a 26\% reduction in the contagion decay parameter. Difference-in-differences analysis reveals this structural change was driven by regulatory-induced deleveraging of systemically important banks, which experienced differential asset reductions of 17\% relative to smaller institutions. The networks exhibit lognormal rather than scale-free degree distributions, suggesting greater resilience than previously assumed in the literature. Extensive robustness checks across parametric and non-parametric estimation methods confirm declining systemic risk, with cross-method correlations exceeding 0.95. These findings demonstrate that post-COVID-19 regulatory reforms effectively reduced network interconnectedness and systemic vulnerability in the European banking system.