[2607.15694]
Shuhei Kato
A voice actor's voice is their asset, and AI cloning directly threatens it. The natural defense flags the enrolled actor whose embedding similarity to a suspect recording crosses a threshold. We show it fails where it is most needed: trained voices crowd the embedding space, and each actor performs many styles. On 1,168 Japanese voice actors (56,568 segments, ~63 h), a misidentification floor survives calibration, score normalization, and discriminative re-ranking (linear and nonlinear, including PLDA): the residual is a limit of the embedding geometry, not of the back-ends we evaluate. The best ensemble still leaves ~2.6% closed-set misidentification, several-fold above matched controls; session-disjoint, re-ranking lowers the floor only to 13.0%. The same crowding drives false attribution: on a generic English encoder, roughly half the clones of non-enrolled people falsely accuse an enrolled actor, while -- by a separate real-vs-synthetic shift -- 32% of Seed-VC clones of enrolled targets are missed at the same threshold; one operating point couples the two, and none escapes both. A domain-matched, voice-actor-trained encoder mitigates substantially (a four-fold gender gap vanishes; wrongful misattribution falls to 1.5-10%), but does not remove the floor. Controls (codec, channel, vocoder, content) support reading the miss rate as a real-versus-synthetic covariate shift, not missing speaker information. Fixed-threshold clone attribution is thus unreliable here, and on a generic encoder unfair. Robust attribution must extend spoofing-aware speaker verification to open-set 1:N (anti-spoofing gate, domain-matched encoder, per-speaker calibration, abstain option), and even then supports detection, not autonomous enforcement.